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PUERTO RICO: STATE FORMATION
IN A COLONIAL CONTEXT
Pedro A. Caban

Abstract

This article examines U.S. Puerto Rico relations during the
American century through the prism of the colonial state
and identifies eight periods of fundamental political and
economic change that altered the conduct of U.S. colonial
practice in Puerto Rico. These periods witnessed the
emergence, ascendancy and decline of local political
coalitions that competed for control of the control state. The
coalitions articulated distinct economic projects and pursued
different strategies to resolve Puerto Rico's status as an
unincorporated territorial possession. Each period was also
marked by insular economic restructuring precipitated by
shifts in U.S. fiscal policies and changes in the economy, by
U.S. congressional efforts to enact legislation to resolve
Puerto Rico's dependent territorial status, and by changing
perceptions of hemispheric challenges to U.S. national
security interests.
Resumen

Este articulo examina las relaciones entre Estados Unidos y
Puerto Rico durante el Siglo Americano a traves del prisma
del estado colonial e identifica ocho perfodos fundamentales
de cambio polftico y econ6mico que alteraron Ia practica
colonial estadounidense en Puerto Rico. Dichos perfodos
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presenciaron el surgirniento, Ia ascendencia y el descenso
de las coaliciones polfticas locales que competfan por el
control del estado. Las coaliciones articulaban distintos
proyectos econ6micos y perseguian diferentes estrategias
para resolver el status de Puerto Rico como una posesi6n
territorial no incorporada. Cada periodo estuvo igualmente
marcado por una restructuraci6n econ6mica insular
precipitada por los cambios en las polfticas fiscales
estadounidenses y en los cambios de Ia economia, por
esfuerzos del Congreso de Estados Unidos para promulgar
legislaci6n que resolviera el status de Puerto Rico como
territorio dependiente y por cambios en las percepciones
bacia los retos hemisfericos a los intereses para Ia seguridad
nacional de Estados Unidos.

Resume
Dans cet article on exainine les rapports entre les Etats-Unis
et Porto Rico, pendant le Siecle Americain, a travers
1'evantail de 1' etat colonial et on identifie huit periodes
fondamentales de changement politique et economique qui
ont altere Ia pratique coloniale etasunienne a Porto Rico.
Ces periodes ont connu le surgissement, Ia montee et le declin
des coalitions politiques locales qui concurren~aient pour
le controle del' etat. Les coalitions articulaient divers projets
economiques et poursuivaient des strategies differentes a
fin de resoudre le statut de Porto Rico, en tant qu'une
possession territoriale non incorporee. Chaque periode a ete
egalement marquee par une restructuration economique
insulaire, precipitee par les changements dans les politiques
fiscales etasuniennes et les changements de 1' economie, par
les efforts du Congres des Etats-Unis apromulguer des lois
qui trouveraient une solution au statut de Porto Rico en tant
que territoire dependant et par des perceptions changeantes
des defis Mmispheriques lances aux interets de la securite
nationale des Etats-Unis.
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F

rom a highly centralized administration supervised by U.S.
army generals, career bureaucrats and carpet bagging
politicians who relegated local participation to the
ritualistic and symbolic, the state in Puerto Rico has evolved into
sprawling bureaucracy with substantial resources. Although still
a colony, Puerto Rico is administered by popularly elected officials
who command extensive decision-making powers over local
affairs. In this article I examine the evolution of the state in Puerto
Rico and identify eight periods as particularly salient in this
process. These periods are: ( 1) dismantling and replacing the
Spanish colonial regime (1898-1900), (2) establishing the colonial state, (1900-16), (3) consolidation and demise (1917-31),
(4) reworking the colonial formula (1932-40), (5) relative
autonomy (1941-51), (6) Commonwealth and industrialization
(1952-68), (7) demise ofELA and annexation (1969-1988), and
(8) reappraisal of the Commonwealth (1989-2000).
These periods witnessed the emergence, ascendancy and
decline oflocal political coalitions that became actively involved
in the administration of the colonial state. While all political forces
and coalitions opposed colonialism, each advanced different
solutions to the island's vexing status as an unincorporated territorial possession. The three positions-statehood, self governance
and independence-stacked out over a century ago, are still
advocated by Puerto Rico's dominant political parties. Historically
those governing coalitions that were able to maintain political
stability and the legitimacy of U.S. rule were often granted wide
latitude by the federal government to manage strictly local affairs.
But whenever these coalitions proved incapable of resolving
economic and social dislocations that threatened stability, the
federal government intervened. Typically these crises in colonial
management corresponded to the demise of the governing
coalition and the ascendancy of new political forces.
During each of the eight periods the political fate of these
coalitions was effected by a combination of factors, which
included changes in the U.S. domestic political economy,
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congressional legislation and executive branch decisions on insular affairs, fiscal and trade matters, and hemispheric strategic
and security considerations. Although it is a simplification, the
political history of U.S. colonialism in Puerto Rico appears to
follow a pattern of federal government neglect and inaction
punctuated by overt engagement when politically salient issues
emerge. For each of the periods I will review the emergence,
consolidation and decline of those sectoral coalitions that gained
control of the state in Puerto Rico, and discuss their performance
in managing economic change, maintaining stability and
advancing its status preference.

Dismantling and Replacing the Spanish Colonial
System (1898-1900)
The United States' colonial policy was designed to
economically incorporate Puerto Rico, the Philippines and Cuba
into the empire, and to secure the allegiance of their subjugated
peoples. The War Department administered the possessions until
a "government which comports with the interests and inclinations
of the dominant power" was established by Congress (U.S.
Department of War, Bureau of Insular Affairs, 1902). From 25
July 1898 through P 1 May 1900, Puerto Rico was governed by
army generals.
Although U.S. colonial officials agreed that Puerto Rico was
"in possession of a complete system of local government," they
decried that it "were so completely at variance with American
theory an.d practice that it was inevitable that radical changes
would have to be made at the earliest possible moment" (Edwards
1904). The military governors lost little time in dismantling the
system of governance the Spanish had set up in the island. The
army issued scores of general orders to establish an "organized
government in harmony with American methods," which would
promote the Americanization of the colonial subjects (Edwards
1904:276). The military quickly set up a highly centralized
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administration that ruled by decree and which was profoundly
insulated from local political forces (see Go 2000).
During the brief period of military rule, the War Department
established a new court system, an insular constabulary and an
internal revenue system; expanded and modernized the sanitation
and public health system, and began an accelerated road
construction program (Berbusse 1966; Caban 1999). The
governor-generals scuttled the archaic educational system left by
the Spanish and initiated a system of compulsory mass public
education that would spearhead the Americanization of Puerto
Rico's people (Negr6n de Montilla 1971). According to GovernorGeneral Guy V. Henry, "the work of Americanizing a new colony
inhabited by an alien people, of a race diametrically opposed to
the Anglo-Saxon in very many respects," was one of his primary
responsibilities. His duty was "to encourage native talent in
adopting our ideas or morals, government and institutions," and
to "educate those inhabitants of the island to our way of looking
at things" (Henry 1899).
The change in sovereignty inaugurated a dramatic
restructuring of Puerto Rico's economy. The monetary conversion
that resulted in a significant devaluation of the local currency,
massive increases in costs of imported capital goods, a new tax
code, and restrictions on the supply of credit altered the local
economy. Particularly affected were the coffee hacendados who,
in addition to suffering devastating losses caused by a terrible
hurricane in 1898, lost their European markets when Puerto Rico
was incorporated into the U.S. customs area (Schwartz 1992).
Given the importance of sugar for the national economy, colonial officials designed policies to erode those social relations of
production and structure of property ownership that could block
the arrival of U.S. firms (see Caban 1999). Initially Puerto Rico's
sugar planters benefited from the arrival of the sugar refiners,
but gradually they appropriated a substantial portion of the island's
productive resources and threatened domestic producers. This
expansion was aided by fiscal and monetary policies designed to
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integrate Puerto Rico's economy into the metropolitan structure
of production and trade (Quintero Rivera 1980). While it is certain
that U.S. capital would have eventually overwhelmed the domestic
sugar producers and refiners, it is also undeniable that the military
regimes created the basis for this process to unfold quickly (Ayala
1999). The economic and institutional policies effected by the
military regimes appear not to have promoted rural landlessness
prior to World War I (Ayala and Bergad 2002). However, they set
the foundations for the eventual displacement of Puerto Rican
sugar manufacturers and general landlessness during the 1920s
(Bird 1937).
By deftly exploiting long-standing ideological and political
differences between the leadership of Puerto Rico's dominant
parties, the governor generals were able to frustrate effective
opposition to their rule. The Federal Party, the more influential
of Puerto Rico's two political parties, advocated statehood preceded by a period ofliberal self-government, while the Republican
Party endorsed colonial tutelage as a preparatory phase for
statehood. The governor generals appointed members of the
minority Republican party to titular positions in the administration
to check the influence of the Federals and establish political
equivalence between the parties. Popular opposition to the new
colonizer was also tempered since the rural population harbored
antipathy and suspicion of the propertied classes who had
benefited from the same Spanish colonial system that had so
abused the rural laborers (Pic6 1987).
So complete was the transformation of Puerto Rico's
institutions that on the eve of the transition to civilian rule General
Davis confidently reported: "the new government ordered by
Congress ... could be launched and carried forward in an efficient
and economical manner" (Root 1916). After 1900, the civilian
colonial officials would carry forth the Americanizing mission,
and U.S. corporations would begin the process of transforming
the island into a tropical sugar bowl. Congress and the executive
branch learned much during this brief period of military rule.
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The lessons learned would be the basis for devising a sophisticated
colonial policy, not only for Puerto Rico, but for the other
possessions and Cuba as well.

Establishing The Colonial State (1900-1916)
The Foraker Act of 1st. May 1900 was a comprehensive
measure designed to transform the economic, legal and political
foundations of Puerto Rico .1 It embraced the British philosophy
that the colonies must generate their own revenues and create a
favorable investment climate, including an effective infrastructure
to attract private capital (Havinden and David 1993). Acoording
to Charles Allen, Puerto Rico's first civilian governor, the c·osts
of running the colony had to be from insular sources "without the
American treasury to rely upon to make up any deficiency" (Wood
1902).
The Foraker Act authorized the president to appoint a civilian
governor who presided over a bicameral legislature that was
comprised of a locally-elected lower House and aU .S. appointed
eleven member Executive Council. With singular ideological
determination, the Executive Council embarked on a comprehensive and systematic campaign to complete the task of
dismantling the governmental and judicial institutions established
by Spain. The Department of Education continued the Americanization campaign initiated by the military-run schools. The
department was crucial in constructing and implanting a new and
alien world view centered on the prevailing myths of the American
experience, but completely divorced from the historical context
of the Puerto Rican people's lived experiences (Guerra 1998).
The courts and body of Spanish jurisprudence that guided their
conduct were targeted for systematic change. For some officials
there was "no more ready or more practical method of
Americanizing our new possessions than by the enactment and
enforcement of American laws, and the introduction and practice
of American jurisprudence" (U.S. Department of State 1904).
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Colonial officials continued to exploit the distinctive material
interests and ideologies of Puerto Rico's political parties. These
officials intruded in their dynamics and worked to alter the
configuration oflocal political forces. During the seventeen-year
Foraker period, the Republican Party emerged as a vociferous
and active political force promoting Americanization and
annexation of Puerto Rico. The party articulated the interests of
business sectors and occupational groups that stood to gain from
economic and institutional modernization. Initially the
professional strata, lawyers and doctors in particular, comprised
its leadership, although sugar cane growers and merchants became
very prominent (Negron Portillo 1981; Quintero River 1977;
Ramos 1987; Melendez 1988). In contrast, prominent in the
Federal Party's were sectors linked to Spanish commercial
interests, especially the coffee hacendados and small coffee
cultivators. According to colonial officials the party included the
"more conservative elements of the population" and the "leading
classes of the country" (Rowe 1902; Negron Portillo 1981b).
Munoz Rivera concurred noting that the party contained "most
of the better element of the native planters, commercial men,
wealthy inhabitants of the city and the educated and refined Porto
Ricans all over the island" (Munoz Rivera 1899). But in 1904, in
an effort to undercut the Republican Party's appeal to the
popular forces, the Federal Party was reorganized as La Union
Puertorriquefia (Negron Portillo 1981 a).
Although the economic position of traditional export sectors
continued to erode, annexation held out the prospects of significant
material advancement for Puerto Rican men and women of business. Given the rapidly expanding demand of sugar in the U.S.,
Puerto Rico's sugar cane growers envisioned stupendous growth
in demand for their product. Puerto Rican sugar producers, among
them Spaniards who decided to remain, were beneficiaries of the
U.S. corporate sugar investments throughout the 1920s. The
transformation of Puerto Rico into a large scale sugar producer
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created new economic categories and reconfigured local political
forces?
The politics of this formative period ofU .S. rule were framed
by the competing material interests of different sectors of the
local bourgeoisie and the expanding professional strata. Politically
the Union and Republican both advocated statehood, but the
former demanded autonomy for Puerto Rico if Congress failed
to act quickly on statehood. The Union sought to shield those
sectors of domestic capital most threatened by the incipient arrival
of U.S. capital. The Republicans, on the other hand, welcomed
the North American investors not only for the new economic
opportunities they provided. Neither the Republicans nor the
Union represented the interests of the rapidly growing rural and
urban working class. The political elite was engaged in political
battles on two fronts: first, against the U.S. officials as they
attempted to negotiate access to power, and secondly against its
own working class that struggled to devise its own political voice
(Lewis 1963).
The fast-paced growth of sugar production and tobacco
processing created a large working. Despite fierce opposition from
the bourgeois political parties, the Federaci6n Libre de Trabajadores (FLT) spearheaded the organization of the growing labor
force in the sugar fields and tobacco sheds. The proletarianization
process was so swift, comprehensive and exploitative that it
provoke wide-scale industrial conflict. The period from 1900
through 1917 was marked by an escalation of labor unrest and
resistance as the sugar and tobacco corporations refused to accede to the workers' demands for higher wages and better working
conditions (Silvestrini de Pacheco 1979). They faced hostile
opposition from colonial officials who were determined to preserve industrial peace and corporate profitability during the preWorld War I era. Only when labor strife threatened to undermine
political stability and erode corporate profitability did the federal
government intervene. In March 1912, the U.S. established a
Bureau of Labor whose lofty purpose was "to promote the welfare
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of the laboring classes, to protect them from exploitation or unjust
treatment by their employers or by other persons of capital" (Puerto Rico, Bureau of Labor, 1914:495).
The economic structuring aggressively pursued by the colonial authorities exacerbated preexisting class antagonisms,
ideological schisms and political ambitions that predated U.S.
sovereignty over Puerto Rico. Angel Quintero Rivera described
the unfolding political dynamics as "la politica triangular."
Political conflict centered among the organized proletariat, the
landed oligarchy that had been on the verge of establishing its
ideological hegemony on the eve of the U.S. invasion, and the
"metropolitan power and classes and social sectors in the colony
whose interests were identified with its policy" (Quintero Rivera
1975). In the context of a highly fractured political and economic
landscape, no unified nationalist movement for colonial
emancipation could be forged. This divisiveness eased the task
of colonial authorities to pursue Americanization and Puerto
Rico's economic transition. Nonetheless, the Union Puertorriquefia waged a relentless political and propaganda campaign to
force Washington to liberalize the Foraker Act. By 1916,
opposition extended to other sectors of Puerto Rico's political
leadership, which uniformly voiced its exasperation with
Washington for failing to expand the scope of local participation
in the governing process.
The Foraker Act sought to reconcile a set of ideas that
emerged from the political and social experience of the American
people themselves with the economic and strategic imperatives
of a new expansionist phase in the development of the American
empire. The result was an ambiguous territorial doctrine that
established a second class citizenship and which barely passed
judicial review. The territorial status of Puerto Rico and the
Philippines, and the constitutional basis for Congressional
authority to legislate over them were decided by the Supreme
Court in May 1901. The cases established the legal rationale that
Puerto Rico was not a nation, a historical community that defined
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itself, but merely a geographical possession of the United States,
the rights of whose inhabitants were to be determined by Congress
(Rivera Ramos 1993:300).

Consolidation and Demise (1917-1931)
The 1917 Jones Act was hurriedly passed as a war measure
in order to quiet the voices of discontent in Puerto Rico on the
eve of U.S. entry into World War I. By liberalizing the despised
Foraker Act and conferring collective U.S. citizenship on Puerto
Ricans, U.S. authorities hoped to silence the growing expressions
for autonomy and independence. The grant of citizenship served
to underscore the determination of the U.S. to retain possession
of its prized colony. The prevailing attitude was uttered by a
congressman who warned Puerto Ricans that the reason U.S.
citizenship was granted was "so ... that the independence propaganda be discontinued, and that our sovereignty remain there
permanently... Puerto Rico will never go out from under the
shadow of the Stars and Stripes" (U.S. House 1996:7473). The
Executive Council was replaced by an elected Senate. Despite
the change, effective decision-making power remained centralized
in the office ofthe appointed governor, who worked closely with
the War Department's Bureau oflnsular Affairs.Nonetheless, by
dissolving the hated Executive Council, the federal government
had made an important symbolic concession to the persistent
advocates of self-government.
In the midst of the disruptive economic changes, access to
state power became particularly urgent for the Puerto Rico's
embattled landed elite. The state became the institution through
which those sectors who failed to adopt to the new economic
order could gain influence and power. In the wake of the Jones
Act, Puerto Rican political parties underwent a seemingly endless
process of formation, fragmentation, alliance building and
decomposition. From 1917 to 1928, the autonomy-mindedAlianza
Puertorriqueiia was the dominant electoral force that unified the
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Union and disaffected Republicans who were frustrated with their
party's conservatism. These Republicans warned against the
denationalization of the economy, the relentless Americanization
of the population and the systematic marginalization of Puerto
Ricans from key decision-making center. The Alianza was also
forged to thwart the Socialists, who were emerging as an
electorally viable political party committed to annexation (Quintero Rivera 1975:76). In 1928, the Union scuttled its alliance with
the Republicans and reorganized itself as the Liberal Party. But,
almost immediately, reform-minded independentistas who
advocated economic restructuring, agrarian reform and political
emancipation within a framework of collaboration with the United
States challenged the old guard.
Those Republicans who had refused to join the Union in the
Alianza formed an electoral pact with the Socialist Party. Although
the Republicans and Socialists were class enemies, they gravitated
toward each other because of a shared ambition to displace the
Union, the perennial advocate of Puerto Rican autonomy and
representative of traditional agrarian interests (see Negron Portillo
1981a). The Republicans, like the Socialists, were ardent
annexationists and patriotic advocates of Americanization. Their
Coalici6n dominated local politics until 1940 and worked closely
with colonial authorities and the U.S. sugar corporations. The
Socialist Party essentially relinquished its formative role as the
independent political expression of the rural proletariat when it
joined the pro-business Republicans (Garda and Quintero Rivera 1982:105, 114).
By the late 1920s, Puerto Rico was engulfed in a deep
political and economic crisis, which was further aggravated by a
disastrous hurricane that struck the island in 1928. In March 1929,
the Coalici6n-controlled legislature requested a $100 million
emergency loan from Washington for economic rehabilitation.
The Hoover administration's meager allotment of $6 million for
road rehabilitation, school house construction and loans to rebuild
the devastated farms utterly failed to arrest the widespread
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immiseration. The Coalicion clung to power, but in the context
political disorder, relentless challenges to its rule and economic
collapse was neither capable of managing the political economy
nor legitimizing colonial rule. On the eve of Franklin Roosevelt's
victory, Puerto Rico's political landscape was fragmented into
highly polarized and deeply antagonistic camps: a newly formed
Liberal Party that advocated independence, a militant nationalist
party that called for a radical break from the U.S., a decaying
autonomy movement, and an entrenched, but vulnerable,
annexationist coalition that was loyal to the United States (see
Melendez 1994:104).

Reworking the Colonial Formula (1932-1940)
The Roosevelt administration was acutely aware of the
urgency for economic rehabilitation, agrarian reform and
emergency relief to arrest the deterioration in the island, and extended its version of the New Deal to Puerto Rico. The emphasis
was on reform, relief, rehabilitation. The New Deal not only
interposed a new dynamic into Puerto Rico's political economy,
but made evident the need for an alternate approach for managing
the colony. It sought to curtail the unbridled brutality of market
forces under the oligopoly of the sugar corporations and promote
a more rational structure of resource allocation and equity-based
growth.
The disastrous economic downturn of the late 1920's
intensified labor's resolve to extract a measure of economic justice
from the sugar barons. During the early 1930s, widespread strikes
and political protest seemed to consume the country. The widening
destitution and social immiserization continued to chip away at
the legitimacy of the colonial regime. The Socialist Party and its
labor wing, the FLT, were unable to impose industrial peace and
control the militancy of an increasingly restive rank and file.
Political party interference led to debilitating schisms between
its politically complacent leadership and the militant rank and

This content downloaded from 169.226.86.33 on Tue, 18 Apr 2017 16:15:17 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms

Puerto Rico State Formation in a Colonial Context

183

file. Conflict over wages and working conditions took on a
militant, nationalist and anticolonial configuration. In 1934, the
FLT experienced its most severe challenge when striking workers
rebelled against the leadership for negotiating an unfavorable
contract with the Association of Sugar Producers (Taller de Formacion Polltica 1982). The seeming collusion between the state
and the corporations inflamed the already torrid state of industrial relations and accelerated the deteriorating political situation.
In this context of profound disaffection with the established order,
the Nationalist Party emerged, in the early 1930s, as a militant
independence movement. With its strident anti-colonial appeals,
glorification of a nationalist ideal and willingness to resort to
armed struggle, the Nationalists posed a very real threat to political
stability (see Ferrao 1990).
The social and political crisis prompted Roosevelt to create
the Puerto Rican Policy Commission in 1934 to devise a program
for restructuring the island's economy. Known as the Chardon
Plan, the program would diminish the sugar corporations'
extensive power over Puerto Rico's land and human resources
through agrarian reform, state-owned and -operated import
substituting industries, and diversification of agricultural
production. Not surprisingly the Coalici6n, the Sugar Producers
Association and influential U.S. politicians waged a vociferous
opposition campaign and ultimately forced the Roosevelt
administration to modify the Chardon Plan, which was the basis
for the Puerto Rican Reconstruction Administration- PRRA(see Mathews 1960:244). Since the Coalici6n had proven
incapable of arresting the political turmoil and social
decomposition, the PRRA was placed under the authority of the
U.S. Department of the Interior. The PRRA promoted agrarian
reform; light manufacturing and public investments in new
productive activities provoked the sugar corporations. The Coalici6n and its corporate allies denounced the PRRA for usurping
the powers of the colonial government and marshaled support
from their congressional allies in Washington to undermine the
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agency. Despite this resistance, it was evident that the Roosevelt
administration was exploring alternative approaches to manage
the troubled colony.
Although the PRRA did mitigate short-term human suffering
and temporarily slowed the pace of social dissolution, it failed to
mollify the militant voices of independence. In 1936, the PRRA
was purged of its independence-minded Liberals. The cautious
elder leadership of the Liberal Party, anxious to demonstrate its
loyalty to the colonial regime, also expelled the independence
advocates from the party in May 1937 (Mathews 1960:324).
The dramatic events of the 1930s radically transformed
politics as usual and gave dissidents in the Liberal Party an
unparalleled opportunity to shatter the hold of the traditional elites.
In 1939, the expelled liberals united under the political leadership
of Luis Mufioz Marin to form the Partido Popular Democratico
(PPD). The PPD's unexpected electoral achievement in 1940 was
an incontestable expression of popular discontent with the
prevailing political leadership. The Roosevelt administration
supported the PPD because it advocated an equitable model of
capitalist growth within the colonial framework.

Relative Autonomy (1940-51)
The 1940s was a decade of rapid economic restructuring
and political transformation. During this period the material and
institutional foundations were firmly established for a post war
transition to a manufacturing-based economy. Under the direction
of the PPD the state acquired a new role as an agent for economic
reform and emerged as a highly effective legitimator of the
prevailing colonial relationship. In the aftermath of the 1930s'
crisis and ensuing leadership vacuum, the PPD appeared as the
only viable force that could command the popular support required
to stabilize the troubled colony (Baldrich 1981). For the U.S.
officials, whose eyes were turned to the conflagration in Europe,
stability in strategically significant Puerto Rico was a priority. In
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order to attain its security goals in the Caribbea,n, the federal
government worked with the PPD, but stifled its radical impulses.
The Populares appealed to a broad spectrum of society, but
relied heavily on poor rural workers, impoverished farmers and
remnants of the once prominent hacendados. The PPD
campaigned against the excesses of the absentee sugar
corporations while it called for more socially responsible and
equitable route to development.
Puerto Rican scholars have postulated that by using the
power of the state, the PPD sought to restore a measure of national
control over the trajectory of economic growth. Quintero Rivera
observed that the PPD-orchestrated industrialization program was
the product of the aspirations of the displaced hacendado class
who hoped to promote a project of autonomous national capitalist
development in which they could reassert their control over
society's productive forces (Quintero Rivera 1981, 1988). Santana
Rabell conjectured that when the PPD came to power in 1940 the
country lacked a powerful domestic bourgeoisie that had the
"objective capacity" to direct a project of national capitalism.
Once U.S. capital had established its dominance over the local
economy in the 1920s and 1930s, it "exhausted the material
possibilities for the development of a powerful national
bourgeoisie." The PPD "had no alternative but to associate itself
in a dependent and subordinate manner to North American capital," and strove to control the colonial state in order to exercise
some direction over Puerto Rican society (Santana Rabell
1984:61' 170).
Governor Rexford Guy Tugwell, a member of Roosevelt's
New Deal brain trust, was a strong advocate of planning and a
Keynesian-style state regulation of market forces whose ideas on
institutional modernization and economic reform influenced the
development goals of the PPD (Padilla 1970; Tugwell 1970).
Thus, although the PPD decried the evils of absentee corporations,
its ideology and agenda for economic reconstruction were in
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keeping with the New Deal spirit and its reformist thrust. On 28
November 1940, Luis Mufioz Marin assured President Roosevelt
that "economically and administratively our purposes are parallel
to those of the New Deal, as applied to the Puerto Rican condition"
(Centro de Estudios Puertorriquefios 1986:15).
With the start of World War II, non-sugar private external
capital investments virtually evaporated and normal trade was
severely disrupted. Fortunately for the PPD, the war-induced
market distortions were beneficial to its development strategy.
Revenues to finance a broad array of reforms, infrastructure
modernization and bureaucratic expansion came from excise taxes
and extraordinary expenditures for military construction projects.
This revenue explosion provided the PPD with much of the
financial wherewithal for its ambitious reform program. From
approximately 1940 to 1947, the PPD pursued an inward-oriented
development strategy that encompassed state capitalism and
agrarian reform.
According to economist James Dietz, during the 1940s "the
colonial state performed the functions of a collective capitalist: it
took risks and accumulated capital; it invested, made plans and
carried them out" (Dietz 1986: 186). During this period the sugar
corporations had little choice, given their waning political
influence, to cede the policy arena to the PPD. The passage of the
Jones Costigan Law revealed the weakening political influence
of the sugar lobby. The law, which was enacted over the opposition
of Governor Blanton Winship and Puerto Rican Sugar Producers
Association (Mathews 1960: 144-145), imposed limitations on
Puerto Rican sugar imported to the U.S.
Although somewhat politically humbled in Washington,
locally the sugar corporations preserved their dominance over
the economy during the war years. In fact, the sugar corporations
were an important component of the PPD's economic program
since their refineries relied on Puerto Rican growers (colonos) to
supply the bulk oftheir cane. As late as 1948, approximately 75
percent of the raw sugar produced by four U.S. absentee sugar
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corporations was purchased from cane cultivated by independent
farmers. The import quotas had not lessened Puerto Rico's
dependence on the crop as its primary source of earnings, which
grew by over 35 percent from 1940 to 1946, while raw sugar
production increased by comparable amounts. These production
increases took place as the corporations imposed labor force
reductions of 32 percent during this period (Perloff 1950:75, 401).
Through the agrarian reform program the PPD attempted to
increase the amount of sugar cane lands held by Puerto Ricans in
order to reduce landless and increase income, while expanding
the party's political base (see Pantojas Garcfa 1990).
The PPD acted quickly to gain self governing powers for
Puerto Rico by arguing that self rule was essential for the effective
management of insular affairs. In 1943, the PPD-controlled
legislative assembly signed a concurrent resolution demanding
that at war's end Puerto Ricans be granted the right to exercise
self determination (Trias Monge 1997:103). In the same year
President Roosevelt set up an executive level committee to examine ways "to reinforce the machinery of self-government in
Puerto Rico." He also called on Congress to amend the Jones Act
to permit Puerto Ricans to elect their own governor and to
"redefine the functions and powers" of both governments (Hunter
1966: 102-103). Both of these initiatives were seen as indications
that Washington was pleased with the PPD's handing of colonial
matters.
While the PPD was able to operate with a measure of
autonomy during the interregnum, the fragile and conjunctural
foundations of its experiment in state capitalism and reform
became painfully apparent after the war. The economy
immediately confronted serious problems. Unemployment rose,
revenues from wartime sources fell to prewar levels, demand for
sugar declined, industrial production stagnated while the
population had grown by over a quarter million. In 1947, the
U.S. Tariff Commission dealt the PPD 's program for equity-based
development a fatal blow when it concluded Puerto Rico could
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not survive economically as a sovereign nation (Baver 1993:1415; Maldonado 1997:52-55). The post war economic down tum,
political opposition in Washington to state ownership of
productive resources and market regulation, and the Commission's
devastating prognosis left the PPD with little choice but to
abandon its inward oriented growth plan. When World War II
came to an end, so did the brief period of state capitalism and
land redistribution.
PPD planners devised an alternative program of
industrialization by invitation that was dubbed Operation
Bootstrap. In 1948, Luis Munoz Marin, now governor, reorganized
the state bureaucracy with the aim of effecting the transition to a
growth strategy based on U.S. investments. Planning, industrial
promotion, infrastructure development and program implementation were centralized in the governor's office (Puerto Rico:
Office of the Governor 1949). The newly established planning
board allowed the governor to coordinate all phases of the
economic program and to adjust it according to changing
economic needs and conditions (Stead 1958: 14). A labor
bureaucracy was set up to monitor and mediate industrial labor
relations, regulate wages and train union leaders in collective
bargaining. These policies were designed to convince U.S.
investors that the PPD would establish the requisite industrial
peace necessary for industrialization (Caban 1989).
By the late 1940s, the PPD had devised the institutional
framework to effect transition to a manufacturing economy in
which U.S. capital would have a decisive role.lts strategy was to
guarantee greater profitability in Puerto Rico for manufacturers
than competing industrial centers in the United States. PPD
planners seemingly anticipated the trajectory of postwar economic
restructuring in the U.S. and devised a strategy to insert Puerto
Rico into this new order. Through its control of the colonial state,
the PPD had the power to create a favorable investment climate
for U.S. firms. In the process the PPD continued to legitimize the
colonial relationship. The implication of the industrialization
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program was clear: Puerto Rico's post war development would
rely almost exclusively on U.S. capital and markets. While low
wages and tax incentives were important, political stability was
essential for the success of Operation Bootstrap. The PPD expelled
members who advocated independence and suppressed the
Nationalist Party in an effort to eliminate sources of political
dissension and conflict. Moreover, in coordination with the federal government, the PPD promoted the emigration of labor that
was displaced in the transition from agriculture to manufacturing
(History Task Force 1979).
In the aftermath of the war, the U.S. became a driving force
for global decolonization, but its claim to moral leadership was
obviously compromised since it held Puerto Rico as a non-self
governing territorial possession. In order to blunt international
criticism over Puerto Rico, Congress enacted two measures that
seemingly granted Puerto Rico self-governing powers: the
Elective Governor Act of 1947 and Public Law 81-600 (3 July
1950). The latter set a procedure for establishing a republican
form of local government in Puerto Rico with its own constitution.3 Subsequent to its approval of Puerto Rico's constitution,
the United States informed the United Nations that Puerto Rico
was a self-governing territory that had freely entered into a
compact with the United States. According to Mufioz Marin, the
new relationship was a compact of free association based on the
principle of consent which took "away from the very basis of the
relationship the nature and onus of colonialism. It cannot be
revoked or changed unilaterally" (Borg 1975:7). Nonetheless,
Congress asserted it retained constitutional authority to alter the
compact, annul the Puerto Rican constitution or "veto any insular legislation which it deems unwise or improper" (Helfeld
1952:307). In 1997, Congress reaffirmed that the "arrangement
(P.L. 81-600) for local territorial government has not changed
Puerto Rico's status as an unincorporated territory subject to the
plenary authority of Congress under the Territorial Clause" (U.S.
House 1997). Neither did ELA alter the laws that had locked
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Puerto Rico into the U.S. circuit of production and trade since
1917.4

Commonwealth and Industrialization (1952-68)
The Estado Libre Asociado (ELA) was proclaimed on 25
July 1952 and presented to the United Nations as signifying the
end of Puerto Rico's colonial status. In a bipolar postwar world
in which national security was threatened by communist
expansion, the concept of ELA as a territorial arrangement that
straddled statehood and independence appealed to U.S. policy
makers. ELA and the ascendancy of the PPD signified for these
policy makers that the interminable struggle between the
independence and statehood advocates had been superseded. ELA
retained the most economically attractive features of the colonial
relationship-exemption from federal regulations and taxation,
duty free access to U.S. markets and monetary system. Congress
further enhanced Puerto Rico's investment climate by amending
the internal revenue code to permit U.S. corporations that
established plants in the island to repatriate their profits tax free
upon liquidation of their operations. ELA enhanced the island's
attractiveness as a profitable investment site for U.S. firms.
Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, the planning priorities were
elegantly simple: to harness domestic resources for industrialization and counteract the destabilizing social effects of rapid
economic change. Since planners were confident that the increased
employment generated by Operation Bootstrap would significantly increase the income, expenditures for social welfare and
public housing ranked very low in their development priorities
(Santana Rabell1984).
The PPD devised a developmental ideology that depicted
the colonial state as rising above the material interests of capital
and labor, and engaged in a process of social reconstruction for
the realization of collective well-being.lt assiduously cultivated
the image of the state as harmoniously and productively mediating
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the relations between capital and labor. Moderately progressive
labor legislation, significant job creation in the public sector and
extensive mediation of industrial labor relations imparted
substance to the ideology. Through these measures the PPD
garnered widespread labor union support and was able to supervise a lengthy period of peaceful industrial labor relations (Caban
1984).
Once ELA was established, PPD strategists used it as a
foundation from which to launch a relentless campaign to
"perfect" the Commonwealth relation (Caban 1993). On 23 March
1959, less than seven years after the proclamation of ELA, Puerto
Rico's Resident Commissioner introduced legislation in Congress
to amend Public Law 600. But persistent Congressional opposition
to the implicit claim of sovereignty contained in the bill forced
the PPD to substitute a substantially revised measure later that
year (see Bhana 1975: 177-186). The U.S. Congress also opposed
any changes in legislation that abridged the federal government's
constitutional authority to regulate Puerto Rican affairs. After two
years of uneventful legislative activity in Congress, the measure
died quietly in early 1961. In 1967, amid deteriorating economic
conditions, internal PPD rifts over development strategies and
the growing popular appeal for the statehood movement, the PPDcontrolled legislature approved a bill to conduct a plebiscite on
status. Unlike its predecessor in 1952, the 1967 referendum was
not authorized by federal legislation and did not bind Congress
to respect the results. The PPD anticipated overwhelming popular support for the Commonwealth proposal, which would give it
"the authorization to develop the Estado Libre Asociado ... to the
maximum level of self-government" (Trias Monge 1981:245).
To the chagrin of the PPD, the statehood proponents garnered
over a third of the votes. The results intensified the divisions within
the PPD and contributed to the party's electoral defeat in 1968 to
the pro-statehood Partido Nuevo Progresista (PNP).
By the late 1960s, Operation Bootstrap had reached its limits
to growth (Villamil1979). The party's relentless drive to "perfect
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the Commonwealth" was frustrated by Operation Bootstrap,
which made Puerto Rico's economy and society ever more reliant
on the federal government to provide social welfare benefits to
individuals and emigration to relieve political and social pressures.
From 1951 through 1968, federal grants in aid increased from 10
percent of the insular government's budget to 23 percent, while
total federal transfers jumped from $122 million to $470 million
(Garcfa Passalacqua 1984:49). Increased dependency on federal
transfers to sustain basic consumption and government operations
were telling indications that Operation Bootstrap had failed to
generate the promised advances in employment and social well
being. Ironically, this dependency strengthened the statehood
movement since as a commonwealth Puerto Rico received only
a fraction of the benefits it would receive as a state (see Melendez
1988:117).
The desultory results of the 1967 referendum ultimately
produced an irreconcilable split in the PPD, and a faction
abandoned the party to organize the Partido del Pueblo (Velasquez
1974). In 1968, this party siphoned enough votes from the PPD
to result in the election of millionaire industrialist Luis Ferre as
the New Progressive Party governor. The stunning defeat marked
not only the end of PPD hegemony, but rekindled the destabilizing
debates of the 1930s and 1940s over Puerto Rico's political status.

Demise of ELA and Annexation (1969-88)
The PNP's unexpected victory ushered in a period of intense
party competition that has lasted three decades. The PPD returned
to power in 1973, but lost to the PNP in the subsequent elections
of 1977. Under the leadership of Carlos Romero Barcelo, the
PNP retained control until1984, when Rafael Hernandez Colon
and the PPD retook the governorship and the legislature in a
bitterly contested election that year. The PPD retained the
governorship for two terms, but was defeated in the 1992
elections by PNP gubernatorial candidate Pedro Rossello, who
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also served two terms. In the 2000 elections, PPD S~ Juan mayor,
Sila Maria Calder6n, became the first woman elected governor
of Puerto Rico.
Each party has employed state power to solidify its electoral base, has lobbied the federal government for more assistance
or exemptions from regulations, and devised economic initiatives
to advance their territorial status aspirations. In this regard the
PPD and PNP behave as any other political party that acquires
state power in democratic systems. Since the inception ofELA,
the PPD has lobbied for increased self-governing powers, while
the PNP has aggressively advocated annexation into the Union.
During the twenty years it has controlled the governorship, the
PNP was able to build a permanent pro-annex_ationist constituency
that comprises almost half the electorate. Since 1968, every PNP
administration also endeavored to intensify Puerto Rico's
dependence on federal transfers, as it sought to dismantle the
institutional and political elements of ELA. But once the PPD
regained control of the state, it attempted to revive the campaign
to convert ELA in an autonomous, self-governing entity. Since
1968, electoral campaigns have become fiercely contested
ideologically-tinged battles between autonomy and annexationist
forces. But party loyalty notwithstanding, voters cast their ballots
for candidates who promise economic growth,job security, public
safety, etc. (see Melendez 1998).
During Ferre's tenure Puerto Rico lost regional markets in
the U.S. to East Asian producers. In an effort to check rising
joblessness and dampen the impact on the economy, Ferre
increased public sector employment, expanded public services
and obtained more federal aid social assistance. Through a variety
of inducements, the Ferre administration sought to weaken the
PPD's traditional hold over the private sector unions (Caban
1989). Despite these efforts, labor militancy increased and the
frequent disruptions did menace the country's fragile investment
climate. Moreover, the PNP was racked by internal power
struggles and was unable to mount an effective campaign in 1972
This content downloaded from 169.226.86.33 on Tue, 18 Apr 2017 16:15:17 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms

194

PEDRO A. CABAN

against a rejuvenated and reorganized PPD. Nonetheless, Ferre's
1968 victory was indisputable proof of an impending realignment.
The PNP discarded the elitism and conservatism of the old
Republican annexationist movement, and portrayed itself as a
progressive political force concerned with the plight of Puerto
Rico's increasing number of poor people (see Melendez 1985).
The PPD returned to power in 1973 on the eve of a deep
recession, and much of its energies were expended.in trying to
halt the severe economic downturn. Throughout his tenure
Governor Hernandez Col6n was forced to contend with declining
corporate profits, increased unemployment, unparalleled labor
militancy- which rendered the structure of industrial labor
relations ineffectual-and a marked deterioration in the state's
fiscal condition. Once in office Hernandez Col6n resurrected the
campaign of"perfecting" the Commonwealth with renewed vigor,
and in 1973 obtained presidential approval for a commission to
study U.S .-Puerto Rico relations. The committee's report, released
in October 1975 as the "Compact of Permanent Union," called
for a unprecedented devolution of autonomous powers to Puerto
Rico. The PPD argued that the restrictive Puerto Rico Federal
Relations Act denied the island the policy tools and the flexibility
to adjust development policy to the changing regional and
international economic conditions.
During the waning months of the PPD administrations, the
U.S. Treasury sought to dismantle Section 931 , a tax provision
that was immensely beneficial to U.S. corporations with
investments in Puerto Rico. The Treasury argued that tax provision
failed to generate sufficient industrial employment and was
exceedingly costly to the federal government because of lost
federal tax revenues. The PPD collaborated closely with the U.S.
multinational corporations and effectively derailed the Treasury
Department effort. Ultimately, Section 931 was replaced by a
new code that was designed to stimulate increased investments
in job-creating activities in Puerto Rico, and which permitted the
subsidiary branches of U.S.-based corporations to repatriate
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earnings derived from their Puerto Rican operations tax free to
the United States. The new Section 936 was crucial to sustaining
Puerto Rico's economic base and facilitated the transition to high
tech industrial investments (Baver 1993; Suarez-Lasa 1994).
The PPD's claim to a populist legacy was badly tarnished
by the decidedly pro-business response to the crisis. Transnational
corporations were granted generous incentives and virtual freedom
from environmental regulations, while the PPD imposed austerity
measures and cut government services. During the mid-1970s,
major strikes broke out in the state-owned telephone company
and water resources authority. During Hernandez Col6n 'swatch,
Puerto Rico became a risky location for the foreign investor. The
developmental credo that industrialization required sacrifices by
the general population had lost all validity for a sizable population
that was mired in poverty and unemployment. For many Puerto
Ricans, the PPD had resurfaced as a technocratically inclined
elitist organization that had forgotten its origins as the champion
of the country's jfbaros. The austerity measures and confrontation
with the labor unions proved highly unpopular and were important
factors explaining the PPD's defeat to Romero Barcel6 and the
PNPin 1976.
Party strategists argued that economic development, industrial peace and social justice were more likely under statehood
since growth was not contingent on tax holidays and cheap wages.
In 1978, the PNP enacted Law 26, which replaced total tax
exemptions in traditional manufacturing industries while
extending exemptions to firms engaged in export-service
(Pantojas-Garcfa 1990: 149).
Aware that the PNP was not committed to preserving Section
936, the U.S. Treasury launched a campaign to rescind the
provision. The Treasury argued that Section 936 was a corporate
welfare program, and like its predecessor, Section 931 , failed to
generate sufficient employment. Over 50 percent of the tax
benefits went to the pharmaceutical industry that generated only
three percent of all employment (Baver 1993:88). Moreover, in
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light of the huge federal deficits, the loss tax revenues to the
Treasury could no longer be justified. Multinational firms rejected
the claims and lobbied aggressively to preserve Section 936. They
used the threat of an investment strike to persuade PNP officials
to lobby on their behalf (Suarez 2000:52-53). Notwithstanding
its philosophical opposition to Section 936, the PNP was forced
to lobby for retention of Section 936. The Caribbean Basin
Economic Recovery Act (CBERA) proposed by the Reagan
administration further jeopardized Puerto Rico's already tattered
economy. As originally formulated, CBERA would have virtually
eradicated Puerto Rico's preferential access to U.S. markets. A
coordinated campaign by the PNP and its corporate allies
convinced Congress to retain Puerto Rico's preferential tariff,
trade and fiscal benefits. In both instances the PNP was forced
into the politically awkward role of lobbying the U.S. Congress
to protect arrangements that were at the heart of the economic
foundations ofPPD's growth strategy (see Caban 1991).
The economic downturn induced by the protracted U.S.
recession undermined popular support for the PNP. Particularly
damaging for the PNP's electoral prospects were cuts in social
programs imposed by the Reagan administration. Reductions in
social welfare spending intensified the precarious economic
conditions of the poor and urban working class- a core
constituency of the PNP. Ironically, although President Reagan
publicly supported statehood, the Reagan Revolution undermined
public confidence in the PNP's ability to garner increased federal assistance. Despite its avid pro-American public posture, the
PNP was unable to increase Congressional support for statehood,
nor was it able to materially alter Puerto Rico's dependence on
external capital for its economic survival. Romero Barcelo
intensified the anti-union policies of the PPD, and in particular
confronted the well-organized and militant unions in the vital
infrastructure industries (see Melendez 1994). In the context of
the economic recession and alienation of public sector workers,
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the PNP was unable to defeat a reinvigorated PPD in the 1984
elections.
Hernandez Colon and the PPD returned to power in 1985,
and within a few months was faced with a new Treasury
Department attack on Section 936. Treasury claimed that the
provision was "one of the most complex in the tax law, expensive,
difficult to administer and yet has not been effective in creating
jobs in the possessions" (Brumbaugh 1988:7). Under the
leadership of the PPD, the multinational corporations formed the
Puerto Rico-U.S. Foundation as a lobbying organization to protect
the tax law. Congress was eventually persuaded to retain Section
936 when Puerto Rican policy makers proposed a creative
capitalization plan for regional development (Baver 1993:107110; Suarez-Lasa 1994: 197). The Puerto Rican government
proposed to generate $100 million in new private direct
investments for beneficiary Caribbean Basin countries. "The plan
was designed to extend part of the 936 tax incentive to investment
in other Caribbean areas," and as such complemented
Washington's strategic objectives in the region (Brumbaugh
1988:7).
The Section 936 debacle left little doubt the PPD had to
develop growth strategies that were not reliant on this vulnerable
fiscal device. The Economic Advisory Council appointed by the
governor recommended converting Puerto Rico into a strategic
nucleus from which multinational firms would embark on
regionally-oriented production activities. To make the economy
less reliant on Section 936 corporations, the committee
recommended incentives to promote domestic capital stock
formation and called for public investments to assist locallyowned industries to develop technologies and products for use
by the multinational firms. It recommended the privatization of
numerous government operations and services, and significant
down sizing of the public bureaucracy (see Consejo Asesor Econ6mico del Gobernador 1989). However, these recommendations
were challenged by the Economic Development Administration
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(EDA), which continued to champion the traditional
industrialization by invitation strategy. Puerto Rico's business
weekly, Caribbean Business (1 November 1990), questioned the
wisdom of the EDA's proposal, noting that "it is time for Fomento
to formulate strategies and assume a strong leadership position
in stimulating investment, economic growth and job creation in
other sectors of the island's economy." By 1989, the EDA's
strategy had prevailed, although some minor initiatives inspired
by the council were enacted. Despite remarkable changes in the
U.S. economy, the PPD was locked into the industrialization by
invitation strategy it helped devise four decades earlier.

Reappraisal of the Commonwealth (1989-2000)
Hernandez Colon returned as governor in 1989, but in the
1992 elections PPD gubernatorial candidate Victoria Mufioz lost
the governorship to Pedro Rossell6, of the PNP, who served two
terms. During this decade Congressional attitude toward ELA
changed dramatically. Not only was ELA considered
anachronistic, but key congressional leaders refused to consider
the PPD's repeated demands to revise the Puerto Rico Federal
Relations Act. In fact, the PPD was advised that the Supreme
Court had affirmed the "temporary nature" of the unincorporated
commonwealth relation.5 The economic and strategic forces that
propped up ELA for over a century were no longer relevant at the
end of the millennium. During this remarkable decade the Soviet
Union collapsed, the North American. Free Trade Agreement was
established, and the federal government rescinded Section 936.
The first development effectively diminished Puerto Rico's
strategic significance. The second exposed Puerto Rico to new
low cost trade competitors and undermined its competitive
advantage. The third revealed that Congress was no longer willing
to promote investment in Puerto Rico by subsidizing corporate
profitability (see Caban 1994). The decade has also been marked
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by two notable, but aborted, attempts by Congress to enact
legislation to authorize a referendum on political status.
In January 1989 the Senate Energy and Natural Resources
Committee introduced legislation to conduct a status referendum
in Puerto Rico. This process resulted in an intensive policy
analysis of impact of a change in territorial status (statehood,
independence or enhanced commonwealth) on the U.S. political
economy. But, after two years of public hearings, committee
meetings and numerous government studies, the proposed
measure died in committee (Caban 1993; Melendez Velez
1998: 161-201). Uncertainty as to which of the three status options
would serve the national interest best doomed the measure.
Legislators found fault with all the proposals for altering
Puerto Rico's constitutional status as a territory. They challenged
the PPD's enhanced commonwealth, which in effect called for
an autonomous state with sovereign powers (except in the areas
of common defense, citizenship, currency and market).
Predictably the U. S. rejected any proposals that would diminish
the federal government's powers over insular affairs. Mary
Mochary, a State Department representative, "objected to
delegating Puerto Rico authority vested in the executive branch
by the U.S. Constitution," and considered proposals for Puerto
Rico to enter into international agreements as "most objectionable" (Caban 1991:19). The Defense Department also opposed
any change that would reduce its military assets in Puerto Rico
or compromise its dominant role in determining the island~s
strategic utilization (Rodriguez Beruff and Garcia Mufiiz 1996).
Many in Congress feared that statehood would ultimately
result in a massive drain on the U.S. Treasury for social welfare
expenses for Puerto Rico's poor, which comprised approximately
60 percent of the population. Particularly objectionable to
conservative legislators was the PNP's notion of "estadidad
jibara," the idea that annexation into the union would ensure
Puerto Rican sovereignty over language and cultural issues
(Melendez Velez 1998:187). Ultimately, the Senate committee
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reacted negatively because of apprehension about the political
and social impact of fully incorporating into the U.S. body politic
the Spanish speaking, Catholic nation of Puerto Rico.
Independence was the most economically attractive
alternative since it entailed the complete phasing out of federal
transfer payments and elimination of fiscal support for Puerto
Rico. In order to assure Puerto Rico's economic viability, the
Puerto Rican Independence Party (PIP) called for unrestricted
access to U.S. markets, preferential commercial and investment
treaties. Moreover, since the leaders of the PIP would not challenge
continued U.S. military presence in the sovereign republic of
Puerto Rico, national security was not jeopardized. Yet, opposition
to the independence proposal did materialize over the length and
cost of transition period for phasing-out federal transfer and
subsidies. Some in Congress rejected any implication that the
U.S. was obligated to subsidize Puerto Rico until it could establish
a viable economy.
While the aborted process revealed the prevailing relationship deficient, the U.S. was not prepared to approve Puerto Rican
statehood or independence. The PPD sought to counter what it
perceived as growing sympathy in the U.S. for statehood by
emphasizing the Puerto Rico's distinctive national identity. PPD
governor Hernandez Colon signed into law a bill that repealed a
nine-decade old statute that legalized English and Spanish as
official languages. In addition, on 8 December 1991, the PPD
conducted a referendum on Democratic Rights that was portrayed
as a popular mandate for cultural sovereignty and political
autonomy under U.S. citizenship. The PPD was confident that
the referendum would convince Congress that Puerto Ricans were
cultural nationalists who reject statehood. To its chagrin, the
electorate voted down the proposal 53 percent to 45 percent.
The defeat set the stage for the PPD's humiliating electoral
loss to the PNP in 1992. PNP governor Pedro Rossell6, sensing
that popular support for the PPD had eroded, called for a plebiscite
on political status. The plebiscite would be a non-binding
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preference vote that would not obligate Congress to respond.
Nonetheless, the plebiscite was potentially very significant
because Congress could not easily dismiss overwhelming mandate
by U.S. citizens for Puerto Rican statehood. On 13 November
1993 Puerto Ricans chose not to alter the balance of power
between the statehood and commonwealth forces. The
commonwealth received 48.6 percent, statehood 46.3 percent and
independence 4.4 percent. The meaning for Congress was clear:
it would not proceed on status legislation given profound divisions
among Puerto Ricans.
Notwithstanding these seeming irreconcilable political
cleavages, five years later, in March 1998, the U.S. House of
Representatives, in a 208 to 207 vote, approved HR. 856. Known
as the Young Bill, it was "a bill allowing the people of Puerto
Rico to exercise their right to self-determination." The PPD
implacably opposed the measure because it stated explicitly that
ELA was not a constitutionally recognized territorial status. The
party threatened to boycott any referendum that failed to include
its own definition of a "new Commonwealth." This would be an
autonomous body politic with its own character and culture, not
incorporated into the United States, and sovereign over matters
governed by the Constitution of Puerto Rico. Congressman Peter
Deutsch criticized the PPD for attempting "to make a specific set
of special rights for an unincorporated territory permanent, rather
than resolving the status of the territory through independence or
statehood. The PPD wanted "to mix-and-match the most beneficial
features of statehood and separate nationality, make it binding on
the U.S. forever" (Congressional Record, 4 March 1998, E370).
Ultimately the measure died when the Senate Natural Resources
and Energy Committee failed to act, so the PNP enacted legislation
to hold a non-binding referendum on Puerto Rico's status on 13
December 1998. The ballot included four territorial options
(statehood, territorial commonwealth, free association and
independence). The PPD called on its followers to vote for a fifth
option: none of the above. This option garnered the most votes
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and was widely interpreted as a rejection of the process as
conducted by the PNP, and an affirmation for ELA.
During the PNP tenure the Treasury Department continued
to lobby for repeal of Section 936. On 18 June 1996, the Senate
Finance Committee complained that "the high cost of these tax
benefits is borne by all U.S. taxpayers" and called for repeal
claiming that few corporations benefited from law (U.S. Senate
·1996). PNP Resident Commissioner Romero Barcel6, a long term
opponent of Section 936, argued that "while wealthy corporations
in Puerto Rico are given billions of dollars in annual tax credits,
the poor, the disabled, the elderly, and children at risk are denied
the same safety net and economic opportunities that their fellow
citizens receive in the 50 States and the District of Columbia"
(Washington Post, 14 Dec. 1994). The possession corporation
tax credit was finally repealed on 20 August 1996.
In anticipation of the cancellation of Section 936, the
Rossell6 administration formulated a New Economic Model in
1994 that "emphasized competitiveness and productivity" while
promoting "economic diversification, instead of the almost
exclusive reliance on manufacturing that characterized previous
economic policy" (Dfaz Saldana 1997). In 1998, the Puerto Rican
government enacted a Tax Incentive Act to prepare the country
for a transition to a "knowledge based economy." To compensate
for NAFTA-induced loss of its markets in the U.S., the PNP
wanted to attract firms specializing in the manufacture of high
value products and corporate services. Although the PNP
economic measures were reactions to the changing economic and
political environment, two aspects of the employment generating
strategy that have been in place for decades did not changeheavy public investments in infrastructure development and
massive bureaucracy that generated a third of the country's
economic activity.
Since its inception the PNP strove to portray Puerto Ricans
as patriotic U.S. citizens who were entitled to statehood. The battle
to end naval bombardment and training in Vieques was initially
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adroitly exploited by the party as a legitimate, popular struggle
by disenfranchised U.S. citizens. The killing, in April1999, of a
civilian security guard by an errant bomb dropped by a U.S. Navy
jet galvanized Puerto Rico against military use ofVieques.A small,
but determined, protest action by the poor community ofVieques
was transformed into organized campaign that garnered
international support. An unprecedented coalition, which cut
across party lines and unified Puerto Ricans and non-Puerto
Ricans alike on the island as well as in the United States, waged
a visible and effective of civil disobedience and incursions into
the restricted bombing range in Camp Garcia. Although each of
the political parties sought to exploit the nonpartisan crusade for
its own electoral purposes, the movement remained resolutely
non-partisan. Initially, the PNP supported the protests and blamed
colonial as the reason why Puerto Rico was unable to halt the
Navy Department's use ofVieques. President Clinton's executive
order to resolve the crisis was rejected by the popular organizations
as well as all the political parties. However, Rossello's unanticipated decision to endorse President Clinton's controversial order
was seen as a betrayal by the broad array of pro-Vieques forces,
and fractured the national consensus (Caban 2002; Barreto 2002).
Sila Calderon's election to the governorship in November
2000 was widely interpreted as a popular repudiation of the PNP
for its stance on Vieques. Her open support for the Vieques
movement was deftly couched in human rights terms, and parlayed
into a emotive defense of Puerto Rican national identity.
According to Calderon, "We are Puerto Ricans who are U.S.
citizens, we are not U.S. citizens who happen to be Puerto Ricans.
We are Puerto Ricans first" (Caban 2001). The resurgence of
Puerto Rican national pride has been a source of indignation for
many in Congress.
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Summary Conclusion
Although brief, the period of military rule fundamentally
altered the political landscape and rules of the game. At the turn
of the century, Puerto Rico's political parties primarily represented
the interests of the country's leading economic and social actors.
Although they were ideologically similar, the Federal and
Republican parties nonetheless developed radically different
approaches in their dealings with the new colonizer. Conscious
that they could work more easily with the annexationist
Republican Party than the autonomy minded Federal Party, the
U.S. governor generals deliberately sought to erode the influence
of the Federals, unquestionably the dominant political force, while
they promoted the fortunes of the Republicans party.
During the Foraker period, the division between
annexationist and autonomy tendencies was heightened, and
ideological differences that reflected class distinctions and
emerging national identity issues became evident. The Socialist
Party emerged as a working class movement that repudiated the
Federal party, which it considered elitist and a vestige of the
Spanish period of agrarian rule. On the eve of U.S. entry into
World War I, prominent members of the Union party who
frustrated by the federal government's refusal to alter the colonial subordination became particularly vocal independence
advocates. Elite resistance and labor militancy hindered the efforts
of U.S. colonial officials. But cleavages along class and
ideological lines did stifle the development of an island-wide
resistance to colonial tutelage. Nonetheless, the signs of
dissatisfaction with colonial rule were unmistakable.
These developments set the context for the third phase, which
was characterized by liberalization of the colonial regime, the
grant of U.S. citizenship and new coalition building across party
lines. While local input into the political process was increased,
the central government did not diminish its oversight and control
of colonial affairs. Prominent Republicans, disgusted with
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oppressive and inflexible colonial rule, abandoned their party and
forged an alliance with the Union. This Alianza continued to
agitate for further liberalization of the regime. Those Republicans
who remained committed to annexation as a state formed a
coalition with the statehood-oriented Socialist Party. By 1928,
the Coalici6n, which had worked productively with the colonial
authorities, displaced the Alianza and dominated the local political
process. The 1917 Jones Act established a new state structure
that held out the promise of increased representation and
accountability. But after a dozen years, the state proved
demonstrably unequal to tasks of guiding the economy and
controlling the excesses of the sugar kingdom. U.S. officials
realized the colonial regime was loosing its legitimacy and
capacity to preserve social order.
The arrival of the Roosevelt administration inaugurated the
fourth phase. During the decade of 1930, Washington wrestled
with the reality of a leadership vacuum that hampered its ability
to deter further deterioration of the economic and political
situation in Puerto Rico. It intervened directly and decisively in
colonial affairs to an extent not seen since the period of military
rule. In order to promote equity-based development and ameliorate
social decomposition, the Roosevelt administration created a
federal bureaucracy which virtually rivaled the existing colonial
state in size and resources. During this troubled decade, the
entrenched Coalici6n was unopposed and worked closely with
U.S. colonial officers, unhampered by a deeply fragmented Liberal
Party. The federal government's efforts to employ the PRRA as a
base for an alternative political force comprised of progressive,
but disaffected members of the Liberal party were frustrated by a
series of factors, including the emergence of the revolutionary
Nationalist Party.
But in 1940, the Liberal dissidents resurfaced as the PPD, a
popular movement that coalesced an array of disaffected forces,
including advocates of independence, labor organizations and the
impoverished rural labor force. Cognizant of the inevitability of
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the country's entry into World War II and eager to impose stability
in the strategically significant, but troubled colony, U.S. officials
sanctioned the activities of the PPD. The party's leadership deftly
balanced the demands of workers and anti-colonial forces with
the strategic and economic interests of the United States, holding
out the promise of independence while expressing its unwavering
allegiance to the war effort. The PPD effected the transition from
an internally oriented, but war-based economy into
industrialization program financed by external capital. The
political and social costs to engineer this change were significant,
including suppression of independence forces, large scale
emigration and the virtually complete denationalization of the
economy. Yet, the PPD retained control of the state until1968, in
large measure because of the absence of a viable political
opposition and generous federal government subsidies. During
this period of extended rule, the PPD never abandoned its quest
to expand Puerto Rico's self-governing powers and continuously
lobbied for federal legislation to alter the island's territorial status
as an insular possession.
With the eclipse of PPD hegemony in 1968, Puerto Rican
politics entered a phase of sustained party competition as
Commonwealth and statehood forces fought closely contested
electoral battles for control of the governorship and legislature.
By 1992, the urgency and political drama. of Puerto Rico's
seemingly endless struggle for political independence and social
democracy had diminished. As politics became routinized, the
state took on a new role as the object of intense political struggle.
With its ample budget, control of billions of dollars of federal
subsidies and extensive powers, the state was not only the single
largest employer, but it was pivotal for the economic fortunes of
local business interests. While the PPD and PNP advocated
different resolutions for Puerto Rico's territorial status, it was
becoming increasingly difficult to distinguish them ideologically.
One outcome of the emergence of the PNP as a viable alternative
to the PPD was renewed congressional interest in authorizing a
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referendum on Puerto Rico's political status. The Executive
Branch also began to reassess the costs of its fiscal policies that
had converted the island into a lucrative investment site for capital
rich U.S. multinational corporations.
What distinguishes the final phase is that the PNP had to
contend with dramatically altered global economic and political
changes that directly affected Puerto Rico's role within the U.S.
system. The collapse of the Soviet Union and its East European
satellites, the end of Central American insurrections and
deterioration of Cuban influence in the hemisphere diminished
Puerto Rico's perceived strategic significance. At the risk of
undermining the Puerto Rican economy, Congress acted to rescind
Section 936, which had benefited a handful of multinational
corporations with overseas operations in the island. While it
also revealed its frustration with ELA, Congress made evident
that it opposed statehood. Puerto Rico's economic and strategic
value to the United States continued to wane during the period of
PNPrule.
With the phasing out of its longstanding fiscal prop, the
economic growth options available to the PNP were extremely
limited. The management of the colony by domestic political
forces had been routinized into a relatively predictable range of
activities. The PNP, as had the PPD,expended millions of dollars
retaining prestigious law firms and influential lobbyists in an effort
to extract concessions and favorable decisions from the legislators
and executive officers. Demands for increased federal transfers,
expansion of public sector activities and a resurgence of the
politics of territorial status were the central concerns of the PNP
during this troubled period. Revelations of massive graft and
corruption and federal prosecutions not only tarnished the image
of the PNP, but undermined the legitimacy of the state. The 1990s
made evident the utter routinization of status politics in Puerto
Rico, and the declining relevance of the state for U.S. objectives
in the region.
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By the end of the 1990s, Puerto Rican politics on the island
was visibly influenced by the activities and the growing political
engagement of Puerto Ricans in the U.S. electoral politics. Puerto
Rican Congress people (Luis Gutierrez, Nydia Velazquez and Jose
Serrano) challenged the Resident Commissioner as the sole
representative voice for Puerto Rico. Their activities influenced
the federal government's assessment of Puerto Rico-U.S.
relations, particularly on the issue ofVieques. The unity of Puerto
Ricans in Puerto Rico and the United States for ending U.S. naval
use of the island of Vieques was unprecedented and revealed the
increasing political salience of the Puerto Rican constituency. The
perception among U.S. policy makers that issues that affect Puerto
Rico resonate with the Latino population of the United States
injects a new dimension to the study of Puerto Rico-U.S. relations.
The state in Puerto Rico has evolved from an autocratic
military regime that was imposed on a subject people, into a
republican government with an expansive bureaucracy that has
attained substantial autonomy over insular affairs. The context in
which U.S. colonial policy was framed over a century ago has
been radically altered, and Puerto Rico's role within the empire
has undergone a profound redefinition. The state has evolved in
the context of a continuous stream of changes in the U.S. political
economy, regional and global transformations, and a vibrant
domestic political process in which coalitions and political parties
have exercised significant influence in the conduct of the colonial
state.
Now the twin forces that have driven U.S. policy toward
Puerto Rico during the last century are dissipating. U.S. national
security considerations-from confronting European expansion
into the Caribbean to preventing the installation of communist
regimes in the region-are essentially without substance since
the collapse of the Soviet Union. The internationalization of capital and the emergence of new trading regimes have undermined
Puerto Rico's economic significance for U.S. corporations.
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The state in Puerto Rico has gradually been trl;lllsformed into
an instrument to advance the status aspirations of the political
party that has captured the governorship. Consequently, the state
is loosing its capacity to mediate, manage and represent the
changing expressions and aspirations of the Puerto Rican
population. Control of the state is portrayed by the dominant
political parties as essential to effect a transition in territorial status, which is necessary in order to effect improvements in the
economy and society. Puerto Rico enters the third millennium as
a colony whose dominant political forces are enmeshed in a
century old struggle to convince the United States to erase
colonialism as one of the last vestiges of the American century.
The political leadership insists that the crisi~ of govemability is a
function of colonialism. For many Puerto Ricans this relentless
pursuit of status change is anachronistic and irrelevant given the
multitude of social and economic problems that plague Puerto
Rico.
A distinctive cultural nationalism is unfolding in contemporary Puerto Rico which appears to disassociate the issue of territorial status from national identity. No party can lay claim that it
is the consciousness of Puerto Rican national identity. Given this
emerging consciousness which lies outside the traditional political
process, the relevance of the state as an integrative institution is
under challenge. This cultural nationalism is not necessarily antiAmerican or pro independence. But it is most definitely based on
the notion that despite being a territorial possession, Puerto Rico
and its people possess political rights that transcend and challenge
the formal-legal parameters of colonial rule. This emerging
identity lays bare the claim that the state is the only institution
that can interpose itself between civil society and the metropolitan
state and represent and mediate on behalf of the Puerto Rican
people. This novel political development has injected a new
dimension to the unsettled colonial question.
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Notes
1

For this period see Caban ( 1999), Luque de Sanchez ( 1980), Berbusse ( 1966)
and Santiago-Valles ( 1994).

2

Some of the relevant literature here includes Giusti Cordero ( 1998), Ayala
(1999), and Garcia-Muiiiz (1996).

3

A selective list of the works on the establishment of the commonwealth of
Puerto Rico and the United States-United Nations exchanges over Puerto
Rico's territorial status include Garcfa Muniz (1984), Trias Monge (1980),
Bhana (1975), Torruella (1985), Rivera Ramos (2001), Fern6s Isern (1974)
and Robert A. Pastor ( 1985).

4

These included exemptions from federal taxation, a common monetary
system, inclusion in U.S. customs area, provisions for the collection and
return of excise taxes, access to U.S. financial markets, special treatment
under federal tax laws, insular maritime legislation, partial exemption from
the Fair Labor Standards Act, prohibitions against commercial treaties with
foreign nations, direct federal transfers to individuals and the public
bureaucracy, and application of Taft-Hartley legislation. The federal
government retained control over monetary and trade policy, mandated the
exclusive use ofU .S. flag carriers for ocean-based trade, and kept the original
Foraker Act provisions that authorized the colonial administration to establish
a tax system.

5

Robert J. Lagomarsino Statement, U.S. House: Committee on Resources:
Hearings H.R. 856; 19 March 1997. Representative Doolittle on 26 June
2000 criticized the commonwealth "is a drain on the American taxpaying
public. Its status is an affront to our constitutional system of government."
U.S. House, Congressional Record, 26 June 2000 (E1113).
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